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ABSTRACT 
As tradeable permit programmes mature, two inter-related issues are becoming more 
critical in creating viable responses to a long-term, highly uncertain environmental problem 
such as climate change.  First, we need to update policies in response to new information; and 
second, we need to design policies so that they can be updated without creating adverse 
strategic incentives for either government or regulated entities.  Consideration of both 
exogenous risk (uncontrollable) and endogenous risk (concerns about policy credibility) 
suggests that permits should be auctioned several years in advance of use, and each permit 
should be defined as a percentage of a possibly varying target.  For exogenous risks, this 
system allows all risk to be pooled and managed as efficiently as possible within the private 
sector.  For endogenous risk, it creates a vested interest that will pressure government to 
maintain or strengthen targets to offset the obvious pressures to weaken regulation.  It also 
reduces the ability of government to reallocate rents without cost to itself, or to gain revenue 
by altering targets.  In addition, policy should be made as complete and as transparent as 
possible, and its key elements should be embedded in legislation to limit prospects for 
capricious changes in the future.  
3   
1 INTRODUCTION 
As tradeable permit programmes mature, two inter-related issues are becoming more 
critical in creating viable responses to a long-term, highly uncertain environmental problem 
such as climate change.  First there is the need to update policies in response to new 
information; and second, there is the design of the programmes themselves (that is, do they 
contain processes for future adjustments in environmental targets as and when the need 
arises?)  In those that do not, serious problems have arisen because changing permit 
allocations can be politically challenging if not built into programme design.
2  For example, 
the New Zealand Individual Transferable Quota system had to change the definition of quota 
to facilitate changes in caps,
3 while in the United States, vigorous debate continues on how to 
adjust the Acid Rain programme to achieve more stringent targets.
4  This is an extremely 
important issue when addressing a long-term, highly uncertain environmental problem such as 
climate change.  
An important part of the integrated assessment literature on climate change has 
focused on the nature of the “optimal” greenhouse gas reduction profile in the presence of 
uncertainties about damages, abatement costs, and discount factors.  Other studies have 
followed the path blazed by Weitzman (1974) and considered how damage and cost 
uncertainty affect the choice of policy instrument, specifically the choice between price and 
quantity (tradeable permits) policies (Pizer, 1999; Newell and Pizer, 1999; Stavins, 1996).  
Another interesting literature has explored the effect of uncertainty on appropriate choices of 
long-term discount rate (Weitzman, 1998; Pizer and Newell, 2000). 
In this paper we focus on the allocation of two major categories of risk between 
private entities and the government in a domestic trading system.  The first, “exogenous” 
risks, are those that cannot be controlled by any party to the regulation.  These include 
changes in abatement technology or scientific discoveries about climate change risks that alter 
optimal regulatory targets.  The second, “endogenous” risks, are those that can be influenced 
by either the government or regulated entities.  These usually manifest themselves by means 
of opportunistic policy change by the government and strategic behaviour (in investment or 
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lobbying) by regulated entities.  Any such action by either or both parties can affect the inter-
temporal credibility of the regulatory bargain. 
2 EXOGENOUS  SHOCKS 
Initially accepting the abatement targets as given, we focus on risks within a tradeable 
permit market designed to achieve those targets, particularly on the impacts of exogenous 
uncertainties on socially-optimal abatement investment responses, and the optimal allocation 
of the exogenous risks between the government and regulated entities (typically, the private 
sector).   
While any distinction between exogenous and endogenous risks can be somewhat 
arbitrary, several factors are external to the operation of a Greenhouse Gas (GHG) trading 
system.  These include natural events (cold winters that increase fossil fuel demand; natural 
disasters that reduce economic activity and damage infrastructure); changes in scientific 
knowledge about the severity of climate change risks; and socio-economic events such as 
changes in social preferences about the level of acceptable climate risk, macroeconomic 
fluctuations and trends, and broad technical progress in GHG abatement.  The form and 
stringency of GHG policy will affect the latter two factors, but their inherent uncertainty are 
largely out of the control of both the government and the regulated entities.  Some of these 
factors are short-term or cyclical (business fluctuations or weather shocks), while others 
(technical progress, improved climate risk assessment) are longer-term in their effect on 
trends in control cost, or the desired level of GHG control. 
The socially-optimal response to these risks is multifaceted.  First, information 
pertinent to these uncertainties should be collected and disseminated.  Second, research and 
development (focusing on the reduction of uncertainties and the increase in options for GHG 
abatement) should be undertaken.  Third, tangible investments will be needed to efficiently 
meet the GHG emission targets.  The irreversibility of investment will bias the investment 
response toward slower and less capital-intensive actions.  In contrast, convex costs of 
investment with regard to time will bias toward more rapid and more readily expandable 
investment as protection against the potential need for more stringent targets.  At the 
aggregate level, society needs to be able to respond quickly, and at low cost, to more or less 
stringent targets.    
5   
In a permit market, exogenous shocks play out in terms of the price of contracts (spot, 
forward, future, and option) for GHG permits.  The imposition of significant regulatory 
constraints on fossil fuel use and GHG emissions creates scarcity rents worth tens, if not 
hundreds, of billions of dollars.  Public and private holders of permit assets will experience 
capital gains when permit prices rise, while permit buyers will experience increased costs for 
covering their residual emissions.  These asset and price risks are negatively correlated.  At 
the same time, changes in the price of permits are likely to be pro-cyclical with regard to the 
economy, in that factors which reduce (increase) economic activity and demand for fossil 
fuels, might also reduce (increase) permit prices.
5  These positively- and negatively-correlated 
risks can be efficiently spread throughout society through choices of private investment 
portfolios (including permit assets), derivatives in the permit market, and insurance.   
Uncertainty also will affect technology choices.  Investors will put a lower value on 
technology whose profitability is dependent on emissions targets being set at a certain level at 
a certain time.  Firms will also see less value in technologies subject to obsolescence through 
innovation.  Risks arising from idiosyncratic technology investments cannot be efficiently 
shared through society.  Private information about the choice of projects, and the effort taken 
to implement them, creates moral hazard problems and precludes efficient risk-sharing.   
Agents that do make idiosyncratic investments will bear too much risk.  Agents with little 
collateral will be risk-averse and invest less than society would like.  Both will generate 
efficiency losses.   
What is the appropriate role of government in implementing this portfolio of actions? 
We conclude that the government does not have a comparative advantage in bearing most of 
these risks, as opposed to having them borne by the private sector.  Obviously the government 
does have a role in public goods provision, including the provision of information and 
activities to correct imperfections in the research and development market (for example, 
support for basic research that reduces uncertainty).  Government also has a role in mitigating 
macroeconomic risks through the implementation of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. 
From the perspective of GHG policy, however, government cannot reduce the 
exogenous risks of shifts in climate change knowledge, social preferences, technical 
innovation, or international macroeconomic fluctuations.  These risks also are correlated 
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across the economy and are not “small” in relation to the overall scale of the economy, so the 
Arrow-Lind (1970) risk-pooling argument for government assumption of risk does not apply.  
Any large or permanent shock borne by government will ultimately be returned to the private 
sector through higher taxation, with taxation’s additional costly distortion.  Nor is it evident 
that government has a comparative advantage in providing insurance.  The private sector can 
effectively establish a variety of risk-allocation mechanisms, including derivative transactions 
associated with GHG permit trading.  The government has no comparative advantage in 
addressing moral hazard problems.   
One role the government could play is distributional.  Some groups have limited 
access to risk markets and potentially disproportionate exposure to climate change policy 
risks.  These groups include workers who have technology-specific human capital (for 
example, coal miners, and low-income groups in general).  However, other than supporting 
basic research and development, and possibly providing a safety net, the government does not 
have a comparative advantage in addressing exogenous risk. 
What implications does the foregoing have for the design of a GHG trading system?  It 
seems to us that the following points are pertinent: 
•  In concert with a trading policy, the government should support basic research and 
development and dissemination of information.  The government also faces the difficult 
task of providing protection for more vulnerable parties in the economy, responding to 
distributional concerns.  A variety of measures could be used, including increases in 
earned-income tax credits and/or job-retraining programmes.  One of several arguments 
for auctioning GHG permits rather than issuing them gratis is that it provides a less 
distortionary way of financing such activities Cramton and Kerr (2002). 
•  One of the strengths of a permit trading system is that it provides a number of excellent 
ways in which the private sector can respond to short-term and cyclical risks.  These 
include the accumulation and use of banked permits, as well as the establishment of 
derivatives markets.  Government should do nothing to discourage these developments. 
•  Allocating permits denominated in fixed numbers of tons forces government to shoulder 
the risk of exogenous changes in future targets (for example, government must buy back 
excess permits if changes in knowledge or social preferences or drops in abatement cost 
lower the desired aggregate emissions target).  To allocate more of this risk to the private  
7   
sector, the government could allocate permits denominated as percentages of uncertain 
future targets to be determined subsequently.
6  
•  While permit auctions have a number of virtues, if the government were to auction permits 
year-by-year, or for only a few years into the future, it would bear more of the asset risk 
associated with future changes in the prices of permits.  To reduce this risk, the 
government could pursue longer-term allocation of permits.  This would not violate the 
given short-term targets; these allocated permits could not be used before particular dates 
(as in the US SO2 programme).  The government could alternatively take positions in risk 
and insurance markets to reduce its risk, but allocating the asset risk to the private sector 
directly through longer-term permit allocations is more straightforward. 
Figure 1  Exogenous shocks, private responses and policy roles 
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3 ENDOGENOUS  UNCERTAINTIES 
In real life, regulations can never take account of all possible contingencies.  Future 
policy is always uncertain and subject to change.  This opens up possibilities for post-
contractual opportunistic behaviour on the part of regulated entities and/or the government.  
These possibilities are rendered more likely by the fact that a sovereign government cannot 
preclude opportunistic behaviour by itself or its successors in the future.   
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Opportunistic behaviour by the government amounts to unilateral modification of the 
regulatory contract, as distinct from Pareto-improving renegotiation as a consequence of 
changes in circumstances.  If the government changes the allocation of permits for political 
reasons, it burdens certain regulatees while benefiting others.  Such changes would tend to 
arise from shifts in the political balance of power in respect of the stringency of GHG control, 
or the allocation of scarcity rents resulting from GHG limits.  
Strategic unilateral modification of GHG policy by the government is problematic 
because it undermines the incentives for efficient investment by the private sector.  If firms 
face increased uncertainty about climate policy objectives because of governmental 
capriciousness, their tendency to invest more slowly and in less capital-intensive actions in the 
face of exogenous risks will be unnecessarily magnified.
7  Permit banking, and thus 
opportunities for intertemporal smoothing of abatement costs, will be unnecessarily limited if 
the risk of permit confiscation is seen as significant.  Aside from these direct efficiency costs, 
strategic regulatory action by government also opens up new opportunities for costly rent-
seeking. 
Private actors may behave opportunistically or strategically with regard to GHG 
policy.  The most obvious strategy is under-investment (either in scale or pace over time), in 
the hope that relief from compliance could be negotiated later.  The sought-for relief could be 
based on sectoral pleading (commonly observed in regulatory debates), or on the broader 
grounds that forcing costly compliance at the scale and pace stipulated in international GHG 
agreements would damage the economy as a whole.  The latter puts future regulators in the 
position of choosing between non-compliance and recession.   
Any single actor considering strategic under-investment must compare the costs of 
under-investment with the probability of regulatory relief.  If actors seek aggregate relaxation 
of targets they compare the higher long-term costs of abatement resulting from their under-
investment if future targets are not relaxed, with the probability of negotiating a future 
                                                 
7 Incentives to adopt new technology would similarly be weakened if the act of doing so triggered a capricious 
tightening of a sector’s emissions obligations.  This point must be handled with care, however, because a drop in 
abatement costs also is a legitimate rationale for the government to pursue tighter standards than it had previously 
(this is the point advanced, for example, by advocates of intertemporal flexibility in GHG abatement).  The key 
question here is the capriciousness of government action in changing standards; what needs to be avoided is using 
the influx of a new technology to justify tougher standards whose benefits do not justify the costs, or actions that 
penalize specific sectors which signal lower costs through early adoption of new technology.  
9   
relaxation in the targets and its expected value to them.  If they are seeking benefits for their 
firm or sector, such as a greater share of future grandfathered permits, they compare the higher 
long-term costs of abatement that their under-investment generates with their expected capital 
gain through larger permit allocations.  The probability of changing government policy 
depends on the political economy of sectoral pleading, and the probability that many other 
actors in the economy also would strategically under-invest, thus heightening the regulator’s 
ex post environment/economy dilemma.
8 
How can these problems of governmental or private sector opportunism be addressed 
in the context of a permit trading system?  Contract theory suggests three basic methods – 
make contracts more complete; make renegotiation more costly; and reduce pressure to 
renegotiate.  In considering these prescriptions, we must also keep in mind the practical 
difficulty of governments binding their successors.  We therefore propose the following 
solutions: 
•  Spell out as clearly as possible the way that different contingencies are to be addressed.  If 
permits are to be grandfathered, for example, the means by which this is to be done – 
including dealing with entry and exit of firms – should be defined as precisely as possible, 
along with provisions for the sanctity of banked permits.  While it is impossible in 
practice to spell out precisely the factors that would lead to changes in aggregate 
emissions targets, clarity in the rules for sectoral allocation will limit some key channels 
for ex post opportunism.  This in turn would increase the longer-term credibility of the 
policy, enhancing the efficiency of investment and causing less discounting for 
uncertainty of future permit assets. 
•  Use an auction for allocating permits, not a gratis allocation formula.  Many of the 
opportunities for governmental opportunism arise in connection with defining or 
redefining permit allocations.  Powerful private-interest blocs can exercise influence to 
the exclusion of others in the negotiation over allocation formulas.  These opportunities 
are precluded if an auction is used.  To be sure, there still will be rent-seeking behaviour 
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in the use of auction revenues, but that is an established part of fiscal policy already; 
unlike gratis formula allocation, an auction does not create a new venue for rent-seeking.   
•  Make longer-term allocations of permits that are specified in terms of percentages of 
future targets thus creating a constituency that can oppose weakening of policy 
commitment.
9  It also means that government cannot gain revenue by changing targets.  
Finally, establishing the design of the trading system in legislation will make it more 
difficult to make capricious changes in policy later. 
•  Establish the credibility of policy targets as well as policy measures ex ante.  The latter 
can be fostered, for example, by establishing the trading mechanism before the beginning 
of the commitment period in 2008.  The former requires enough social consensus about 
the goals of climate policy that large parts of the private sector will be deterred from 
strategic under-investment, because there is some assurance before the fact that society 
understands and is willing to bear the costs. 
In conclusion, measures needed to address exogenous and endogenous risks in a GHG 
trading system are complementary.  In both cases, clarity in the permit mechanism and 
allocation process and use of long-term allocation with banking seem warranted. Using 
permits denominated in shares of total emissions could create incentives for governments to 
raise revenue by making targets more stringent if permits are not allocated in advance.   
However, when combined with long-term allocation, this approach also seems to have merit.  
A bigger challenge may arise in reconciling the advantages of inter-temporal flexibility in 
responding to long-term climate targets under uncertainty, and the problems of deterring 
strategic under-investment or governmental shirking.  Here again, a long-term allocation 
creates some countervailing pressure against opportunistic future relaxation of standards (as 
does technical progress that reduces future control costs).  
Auctioning permits defined as a percentage of the target in advance has implications 
for innovation incentives.  The returns from innovation are initially captured within the 
private sector, but not necessarily by the innovator.  With advance allocation of permits, 
innovators can capture the “emissions payment” effect, which arises from the fall in permit 
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11   
price they induce, by holding permits short.  If the target is made more stringent in response to 
the lower costs, the private sector receives any benefits from this through higher asset prices 
as well as bearing the higher abatement costs, in the same way that exogenous shocks are 
borne. 
Figure 2  Endogenous shocks, possible renegotiation, private responses, and 
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Consideration of both exogenous risk (uncontrollable) and endogenous risk (concerns 
about policy credibility) suggests that permits should be auctioned several years in advance, 
and each permit should be defined as a percentage of a possibly varying target.  For exogenous 
risks, this system allows all risk to be pooled and managed as efficiently as possible within the 
private sector.  For endogenous risk, it creates a vested interest that will pressure government 
to maintain or strengthen targets to offset the obvious pressures to weaken regulation.  It also 
reduces the ability of government to reallocate rents without cost to itself, or to gain revenue 
by altering targets.  In addition, policy should be made as complete and as transparent as 12   
possible, and its key elements should be embedded in legislation to limit prospects for 
capricious changes in the future. 
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